Act, the Federal Reserve Board weighs the public benefits from proposed acquisitions by bank holding companies (hereafter called BHCs) against possible adverse competitive effects.~BHCs are asked to discuss public benefits of proposed acquisitions in applications to acquire banks and noubanking firms. A public benefit commonly mentioned in applications for the acquisition of additional banks is increased trust services to be offered to customers in the areas of the proposed subsidiaries, 2
Banks outside metropolitan areas and banks with relatively few customers generally do not have enough potential trust customers to justify hiring a staff to specialize in trust services. In some applications BHCs indicate plans for sharing the expertise of trust department employees of their larger banks with the proposed subsidiaries. In other cases the BFICs plan to offer trust services directly through the trust departments of their larger banks. It is contended that under both policies the potential customers of the banks to be acquired would have opportunities of receiving better trust services as a result of the affiliation of local banks \vith BFICs. as amended reads as follows The Board shall not approve any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transactions are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
2 See orders on bank holding company cases published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The objective of this paper is to determine whether the amount of trust business in areas served by banks affiliated with BHCs is significantly different from that in areas not served by affiliated banks, Several variables, in addition to the affiliation of banks with BHCs, are included in regression analyses to estimate the influence of BHCs on the trust business of banks in areas served by their subsidiaries.
The paper is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the measure of trust business and the variables used to explain the level of trust business. The second describes the sample of banks used to estimate the influences of these variables on the trust business of banks. The third section presents empirical tests of hypotheses.
DETERMINANTS OF THE LEVEL OF TRUST BUSINESS IN INDIVIDUAL AREAS
The model specifies the factors which are presumed to influence the demand for trust services by individual bank customers and the supply of trust services by individual banks. The theoretical demand and supply functions are aggregated across individuals, firms, and banks, and a reduced form equation is specified which indicates how the demand and supply factors influence the level of trust services. The measure of trust business in an area is the revenue of bank trust departments per capita; trust revenue equals the quantity of trust services multiplied by the price of trust services. Measurement of the influences on the demand for and supply of trust services is discussed in the section where these influences are combined in a reduced form equation. Some influences on the trust business of banks are mentioned, but not measured, due to a lack of data.
Demand for Trust Services
Individuals demand trust services to secure management of their wealth. Some trust arrangements are established by wills which give trust departments authority to sell the assets of estates and distribute the proceeds to the beneficiaries. Other trust accounts are established as living trusts under which individuals, while still alive, transfer legal title to part of their wealth to trust departments to he invested and disposed of as the trust agreements specify. Under another type of arrangement, a trust department does not own the assets of an individual, but acts as am agent in managing his portfolio or giving investment advice?
The demand for trust services by am individual is assumed to be positively related to his wealth and, holding wealth constant, positively related to his age. Holding constant the influence of wealth, an individual is more likely to establish a living trust as he gets older and considers the problems associated with transferring am estate to his family. Also, influences like poor health may induce older people to use trust departments as agents for investing their wealth. The demand for trust services by an individual at banks in the area in which he lives is assumed to be negatively related to the price of trust services in that area; positively related to the prices of trust services in nearby cities and to the prices of alternatives to trust services; and positively related to the length of time the individual has been in the area. If this individual has moved into the area recently, he is more likely to have established a trust account at a hank outside of the area than someone who has lived in the area all of his life. The prices of trust services in nearby cities and the prices of alternatives to trust services are not measured in this paper and therefore are not mentioned again as determinants of trust services.
Business firms demand trust services mainly for the management of funds in employee benefit programs. This source of demand at banks in an area is assumed to be positively related to the percentage of employees in the area that are accumulating pension benefits. Although trust departments provide other services for There are costs to these potential customers of coming to establish trust accounts in terms of travel time and explicit travel costs. These costs are smaller for people from surrounding counties who regularly come into the county for reasons other than shopping for trust services, such as commnting to work, entertainment, and general shopping. 
Supply of Trust Services
Some of the functions performed in managing trust assets are the same as those involved in other operations of a bank, such as buying and selling government securities and evaluating the future profit prospects of companies. If the other departments of a bank have enough business to take advantage of some of the economies of scale in banking, the trust department of that bank would have a lower cost structure than the trust department of a smaller bank.
Any influence that lowers the costs to a bank of supplying trust services shifts its supply schedule for trust services so that more trust services are offered at each price. The supply of trust services by an individual bank is assumed to he a function of the following variables: the price of trust services (+); the costs of inputs, such as labor (-) ; the volume of transactions at the bank outside of the trust department (+); and affiliation of the bank with a BHC (+). The sign of this last variable is positive if BHCs help their subsidiary banks develop their own trust departments. Several studies indicate that there are economies of scale in bank trust departments Suppose that a BHC helps its subsidiary banks lower their operating costs by pooling operations. This influence on the cost structure of a subsidiary bank would induce it to offer more trust services at each price than it would have without affiliating with the BHC. The costs of bank inputs are not measured and therefore are excluded from additional analysis. 
Reduced Form and Empirical Proxies
As indicated above, the trust business of banks in an area is measured by the revenue of their trust departments per person living in the area.
6 Demand and supply functions for trust services can be estimated only with separate measures of price and quantity of services. These are not available. However, the revenue of bank trust departments can be specified as a function of variables listed above which influence the supply of and demand for trust services.
Changes in variables that induce an outward shift in the demand function cause trust revenue to rise. The influence of shifts in the supply curve depends upon whether the supply curve intersects the demand curve on its elastic or inelastic portion. If the supply curves intersect the elastic portion of the demand curves in all areas under analysis, changes in supply variables that cause the supply curves to shift to the right will increase trust revenue. There is no data to indicate whether this assumption is warranted. Therefore, the direction of influence of supply factors on the trust revenue of banks must he determined empirically; neither positive nor negative signs are hypothesized.
The following list indicates the measurable variaables hypothesized to influence trust revenue per cap- The names and sizes of the BHCs represented in banks to increase their own trust business, An the study are given in Table II . In most counties in alternative hypothesis with the same implicawhich BHCs were represented, only one bank was a tion is that local banks other than those affilsubsidiary of a BHC. In one county in Tennessee significant influence on the trust sen'ices offered to potential customers of their subsidiary banks.°Some counties in Florida were originally included in the empirical analysis but were later excluded because those counties increased the standard error of estimate substantially.
This result is probably due to a large number of retired people in Florida who have a higher ratio of nonhuman wealth THE SAMPLE OF BANKS to income than people in the other three states in the study.
With data for Florida included in the sample and dummy variables added for states, only the dummy variable for The banks in this study are located in 125 counties Florida counties has a regression coefficient that was signifiin the following states: Iowa (75) 
000000000000-
include all of the independent vanables. There is col-
linearity among the independent variables, making it difficult to determine the contribution of individual~-. ounty less than population density in surrounding counties and (b) the percentage of workers employed as domestics and in agriculture, a proxy for~ §w orkers without pension plans (see Table IV The tests for the statistical significance of the regression coefficients cannot discriminate between these two hypotheses.
Collinearity among the independent variables may be the influence which causes the t-statistics of the regression coefficients for the dummy variables representing BHC affiliation to be so small as to indicate lack of statistical significance. Given that possibility, a relevant question is: what is the economic significance of those dummy variables for trust revenue if the question of statistical significance is ignored? The dependent variable is measured as dollars of trust revenue per capita. Therefore, the regression coefficient of the dummy variable BHC 71 indicates that trust revenue per capita was about $0.10 higher on average in areas in which one or more banks were subsidiaries of BHCs, holding other factors constant. The difference was about $0.01 using the dummy Bk-IC 70. These differences are so small as to indicate little economic significance, especially since for the sample of counties trust revenue per capita ranges from $0005 to $4823.
Equations 1-3 and 6-9 in Table III were reestimated using average trust revenue per capita in the years 1969-71 as the dependent variable. This was done to determine whether a significant amount of random variation could be removed by averaging over several years. The regression results with this dependent variable are not substantially different from those results in Table III . The predictive ability of the independent variables is not substantially higher with the dependent variable, trust revenue, averaged over three years, indicating little variation in the trust revenue of banks over several years.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the influence of bank holding companies (BHCs) on the trust revenue of banks in areas in which banks are affiliated with BHCs. Remarks in other studies indicate that BHCs could be expected to either increase or decrease the trust activities of their smaller subsidiary banks, depending upon the policies of the BHCs. This paper presents equations for estimating the level of trust business of banks in county areas using several variables which are assumed to influence the demand for or supply of trust services. The trust business of banks is measured as the revenue of bank trust departments in each county per person living in the county. The following variables are the most useful for estimating the trust revenue per capita: median family income, the percentage of population 45 years and over, and the size of the largest bank in the area.
The results of this paper have an implication for the regulation of BHCs. The empirical results do not indicate an influence of BHCs on the trust revenues of banks in areas with subsidiaries of BI-ICs. Therefore, it is appropriate, to give little weight to promises by BHCs that they will increase trust services offered to customers of their subsidiary banks until some evidence is presented to support this contention. 
